network forms towards an understanding of their role in the innovation process, principally in high-technology industries. This approach is especially prevalent in the study of research and development (R&D) and cluster studies (Swann et al. 1998) . These industries, characterized by telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, are not often representative of many other sectors, especially those characterized as low-tech. Focus has turned therefore to networks and innovation within traditional industries. There has been an acknowledgement that relationships between suppliers and manufacturers within the automotive sector have been transformed by network relationships (such as the dynamic network of Dicken 1998), particularly those driven by new information communications technologies (ICTs) such as electronic data interchange (EDI). Jarillo (1993) and (particularly) Abernathy et al. (1999) have extended the understanding of these processes into other sectors such as the textiles industry. Competition and innovation are increasingly being undertaken simultaneously between firms involved in vertical and horizontal network relationships. The role of vertical chains is most evidently expounded in studies of international systems of disintegrated manufacture, commodity chains (Gereffi 1994 ; and the allied concept of the differentiated network, Nohria and Ghoshal 1997) , and in studies of cooperative innovation between firms in the supply chain (Tether 2000) . Several studies have examined the innovation process within these types of vertically non-integrated production systems. In these analyses, the role of customers driving innovation often implicitly assumes the customer to be another firm within the vertical chain, typically a downstream manufacturer (as in Clark et al. 1987; Harabi 1998) rather than the final consumer.
Our paper extends the analysis of network forms and the innovation processes between firms in vertical relationships. The paper seeks to understand how organizational structures and innovation might be altered within a traditional sector that has introduced new ICT-based technologies. We have sought to do this by means of detailed research into the UK food processing and retailing industry, where during the past decade the competitive dynamics have been transformed as a result of the introduction of networks and EDI systems by the large-scale multiple retailers (supermarkets). Studies in the 1980s by Senker (1986 Senker ( , 1988 identified that the impetus for innovation in processed food was beginning to move from branded manufacturers to retailers. This shift has continued, and the introduction of generic ICTs has further strengthened the position of the multiple retailers relative to manufacturers (Cox et al. 2002) . The present paper finds that there are two complementary networks engendered by the use of new ICTs, one based on innovation and the other on control. An interesting aspect of the network systems depicted in this paper is that they encompass and are partly driven by the final consumer, as well as by producers themselves.
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
During the mid-1980s Senker (1986 Senker ( , 1988 examined the newly identified role of UK food retailers in new product development (NPD) in order to test whether contemporary economic theories could account for this pattern of innovative activity, and found that they lacked explanatory power. Recent developments in the study of business networks, outlined in the introduction, have widened theoretical approaches so as to examine both networks and innovation. This paper draws on network theory's contribution to economic analysis to enable an examination of retailer-centred vertical chains in the chilled ready-meals sector. The principal theoretical framework used in this paper follows the economic network-theory approach developed by Mark Casson (Casson 1997; Casson and Cox 1997) , which emphasizes the centrality of information within an economic framework. In moving beyond the conventional axioms of transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975 (Williamson , 1985 , network theory allows for more complex relations between ownership boundaries and the effective locus of control, and addresses how such relations are facilitated through its systems of information management. As such, the focus on networks anticipates greater flexibility in the ownership boundaries of firms within industries, with the optimal configuration emerging as the dynamic outcome of the interplay between technological change and the exigencies of the competitive process. Furthermore, this information-based approach incorporates an understanding of the role of social mechanisms in creating, guaranteeing and perpetuating trust from an economic perspective. This is particularly useful in examining networks that involve informal organizations such as those identified in this paper, and can help develop an analysis of detailed case study examples. From an historical perspective, Chandler's approach (1977 Chandler's approach ( , 1990 Chandler's approach ( , 2000 to examining business structure also provides our study with a useful framework to understand organizational and industrial change.
The theoretical approach used to identify the changes within the food processing industry and the relationships between firms has been supplemented by more detailed study of specific sets of vertical relationships. In order to test the validity of our characterization of the contemporary network relationships and innovation process in the sector we also undertook a series of semi-structured interviews designed to substantiate and augment our findings and to build up a detailed knowledge of the functioning of networks. To examine the processes of control and innovation, we selected one of the vertical chains in the industry that we deemed to be representative. This vertical chain related to a retailer, 1 Retailer A, which accounted for a significant share of the final market for chilled ready-meals. For the examination of the control network in this vertical chain we interviewed general managers from logistics contractors that we termed M (General Manager Development Consumer Europe) and N (Development Director, Europe) the Project Manager for Chilled and Perishable Goods in Retailer A. For the innovation network we followed a similar methodology to the interview-based approach used by Senker (1988) . Senker made detailed case studies of the main UK grocery retailers in order to examine how they were able to develop products during the mid-1980s when these retailers were beginning to establish novel own-brand products. Through interviews with retailers in the sector she found that some retailers were innovating products and processes, whilst others were merely contracting suppliers to create own-label versions of branded products. The true innovators directly promoted the manufacture of novel products by adopting closer relations with their suppliers, and setting up (or extending) their own internal product development departments.
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This paper builds a similarly detailed picture of the innovation network in the sector through interviews with Retailer A's 3 NPD section (principally the Senior Trading Manager for Fresh Foods) and representatives of supplier firms and contractors. Interlocking testimony was used to verify information given by interview subjects, which was particularly successful in this case because of the nature of the career path within the industry (there was some overlap at times between actors simultaneously involved in both networks). The interviews had a built-in variety as it was common for actors to have experience at different stages of the value chain, and for retailers, contractors and suppliers to have worked for other companies in the sector. 4 In this way, and by a brief examination of the retailer innovation network of another food retailer, designated as Company E, the representative nature of the selected vertical chain was corroborated. In addition to this programme, supporting interviews were held with those holding a global and long-term view of the industry, namely industry trade journal editors (e.g. Frozen and Chilled Foods, Food Manufacture) and trade association officials.
THE INNOVATION NETWORK

The characteristics and structure of the chilled ready-meals market
The emergence of network structures in the food processing and retailing sector can be best understood in the context of two primary factors: first, the food retailers' 2 Senker divided retailers into two main categories: acceptors (who commissioned suppliers to replicate products, accepting supplier standards) and intervenors (who were intimately involved in the product development process with suppliers). The mechanism by which firms dealt with suppliers or managed product development in food was through the establishment of their hygiene departments and food technicians. M&S and J. Sainsbury's food hygiene departments underwent a radical change in the 1970s, increasing the number of staff, shifting their emphasis to quality control, product development, packaging technology and machinery. From the adoption of new ICTs, and second, the example of the system of relational contracting established by the clothing and foodstuffs retailer Marks and Spencer (M&S), which described itself as ''a manufacturer without factories''. M&S's practice of relational contracting was transferred from its clothing and textiles activities to its food business, and then to the supermarket grocery sector in general, as retailers sought to emulate M&S's differentiation strategy and suppliers adopted their quality standards and systems in order to supply the supermarket sector. The chilled ready-meals market sector was pioneered by M&S, and the major UK 6 multiples developed their own lines in the 1990s in response to this. Chilled readymeals are high value-added premium convenience products, which have displayed rapid growth during the 1990s (see Table 1 ). They are ready-prepared complete meals or meal centres that need only heating by oven or microwave 7 and are chilled, not frozen, for freshness. As the meals are highly perishable, and have a very limited shelf life, they require a sophisticated chill chain which can deliver meals from manufacturer to point of retail in a few days.
The appeal of the sector is not only convenience, but also its ability to provide quality substitutes to restaurant meals. Variety is therefore a key aspect of the sector, and retailers need to be able to respond not only to the market demand in terms of allocation, but with a corresponding array of new products. The sector is largely controlled by six retailers that account for some 95 per cent of the market by sales (see Table 2 ).
Retailers use chilled ready-meals as part of their own-brand differentiation strategy, a strategy that has been a key to competitive success within the sector.
8 Retailers therefore attempt to follow customer eating trends closely and the range of products offered by firms within the sector is very large-despite the low volume sales in 6 The UK accounted for 49 per cent by value of the European chilled ready-meals market in 1998. Germany and France accounted for 21 and 20 per cent, respectively. The bulk of the products for France and Germany is accounted for by chilled Pizzas, which are qualitatively quite different from ready-meals in general. Source: Vickers (1999) . 7 This ''dual-ovenable'' product characteristic is one that demands leading-edge materials technology in terms of hygiene and packaging. This also requires that the manufacturers, packagers, and retailers develop the product packaging closely together, as the packaging also forms part of the retailer's generic own-branding strategies. 8 Own-label products are where retailers source the supply of lower-price alternative products to compete with branded manufacturers' products, usually at the bottom end of the market (Burt and Sparks 1997) . Own-brand goods are those products developed by the retailer to strengthen their brand as retailers, and were developed chiefly in the UK market (Fernie and Pierrel 1996) where their influence is strongest. Table 3 . In contrast to the dominant position of the leading retailers, the manufacture of chilled ready-meals is widely diffused, with branded manufacturers accounting for less than 5 per cent of total production. In the UK the sector is supplied by over 180 firms ranging from specialist micro-kitchens employing less than five people to a few large companies such as Northern Foods and Hazlewood (Grocer 1997) . The largest firms supplying the sector may produce other chilled products in addition to readymeals, but these are the exception. 9 As product development in the sector is retailerled, suppliers exhibit some distinctive features in terms of nature and composition. Retailers tend to source from a great number of suppliers in order to respond quickly to new restaurant trends with new recipes, exploiting the flexibility of small suppliers. Many of these recipes, especially in the ''ethnic'' area, are initially developed by very small specialist companies some of whom, such as Noon Foods, have become major firms through their association with the retail sector. Table 4 indicates the largest suppliers to the sector and gives some indication of their main customers. 10 The range 9 Geest and Hazlewood, for example, are manufacturers of other chilled products, such as pasties and chilled pizzas. Northern Foods supplied M&S exclusively with chilled ready-meals until 1999, but supplied other retailers with chilled products. 10 Data in this sector is extremely difficult to obtain due to the intense competition within the retail sector, and the sensitive nature of customer-supplier relationships. We are not able to give confidential information released to us by firms used to inform this investigation, but have attempted to give publicly available information wherever possible. The data in this table therefore shows publicly known links and the largest supplier firms and is not comprehensive.
of dishes is also dependent on access to many specialist suppliers, as the production of ready-meals spans different product bases (poultry, fish, meats, vegetables), market segments (healthy eating, luxury, etc.) and ethnic recipes (traditional British, oriental, French, Italian, Thai, Tex-Mex). As Table 4 indicates, the specialist suppliers are mostly smaller companies. The largest volume of production, however, is sourced from a small group of manufacturers; Northern Foods for example supplies about 30 per cent of M&S convenience foods and Hazlewood Foods produces 20 per cent of all chilled ready-meals. Because the major volume manufacturers have developed in conjunction with retailers, they often have an exclusive relationship with them. In some cases larger producers supply several retailers, but in different product areas with little overlap. 11 Where overlap exists, manufacturers may have dedicated plants for each retailer, producing meals to their specification. 12 No manufacturer supplies the same product to multiple customers.
Profits in the chilled ready-meals market are not derived primarily from the economies of standardization. Rather, variety, novelty, and quality are the key elements. The chilled ready-meal NPD process therefore needs to be rapid and responsive to changing customer tastes. The organizational solution to this problem in the sector is an inter-organizational trust-based network rather than a strategy of internalization. The large retailers are in a position to gain marketing information directly via their intimate relationship with the customer through point of sale (POS) monitoring, customer loyalty schemes (exploited by sophisticated data mining centres maintained by the retailers) and their own market research. The aim is to identify new market niches, and fill them with new differentiated products as quickly as possible, and thereby respond effectively to new eating trends. Thus the critical information required to develop new products is obtained by retailers, who then use this knowledge to leverage control over the innovative process as a whole. Retailers in the UK are able to coordinate the development of new products as they have internal hygiene and product development departments, even though they do not have any production capacity of their own (Senker 1986 (Senker , 1988 Hughes and Merton 1996; Fernie 1997 ).
Coordinated new product development through strategic alliances: Retailer A's innovation network
Retailer A is an example of a firm that has been able to exploit its proximity to the consumer to develop new products more effectively than firms higher up the value chain. Retailer A derives knowledge about consumer trends through the innovation network, especially from expert sources of information and small specialist companies, in addition to its own consumer-based information. Retailer A accepts that ''many new product ideas come from our suppliers and we work very closely with some of the top chefs . . . so we follow those consumer trends which are very fashionable''. The relationships engaged in this sector are best understood as inter-organizational networks whereby manufacturers and packaging firms develop new products in conjunction with retailers. Figure 1 depicts the NPD network.
Retailer A claims to have a ''very long term relationships with [its] suppliers''. Trust within long-term relationships is critical (Lane and Bachmann 1998). Retailer A has no capital stake in suppliers, and there are few formal contracts between retailers and food suppliers in the chilled ready-meal sector but instead many strategic alliances based on mutual advantage. Relations essentially take the form of a ''gentleman's agreement'' and this is made possible by the structure of the industry created by the innovation network itself. Retailer A uses many small suppliers to ensure it has access to a large variety of recipes, but relies on Supplier Z for 50 per cent of its ready-meals by sales volume. As is typical with the larger suppliers in the sector, Supplier Z has a dedicated factory for Retailer A, guaranteeing confidentiality and exclusivity. Details of products, specifications and recipes developed for specific retailers and retailer's sensitive information remain confidential, as suppliers rely on retailers' loyalty and support in an oligopolistic final market comprised of few firms. This trust has enabled Retailer A to move from business plans of typically 3 years to longer terms of 5 years, and implement joint investment plans. These plans range from non-contractually based agreements in which Retailer A agrees to ''deliver a volume of business to a manufacturer for five years and the manufacturer invests in a dedicated factory'', to arrangements to supply small firms with technical assistance in return for access to new recipes. For this process to be effective the retailer must ensure that its quality standards and processes are adopted and integrated with its packaging and, crucially, own-brand marketing strategy. Information needs to be passed between the partners in this network. The ''relationships in this sector are different than when you are working with the big branded suppliers as we work very closely with ready-meal suppliers and the confidences that we tell them we wouldn't do on the branded side''. This is especially significant for small-scale suppliers (whose continued existence is crucial to the retailer in developing new products quickly) where the retailer is their sole client. 13 In certain examples, retailers can help lower the asset specificity risks and information costs of suppliers by lending specialist staff, information, equipment, and money in return for dedicated investments. This series of very close relations binds the network firms into mutual dependencies whereby it becomes more profitable for firms to act without opportunism, having redefined the pay-off structures to reward cooperative approaches. In the case of large manufacturers the relationship centres on negotiation over exclusivity agreements, the use and development of dedicated manufacturing centres, and the coordination of new hygiene technologies and processes, such as the development of specific packaging systems. Relations with smaller firms, many of which could be termed ''micro-kitchens'' employing less than 10 staff, were characterized more by an exchange of hygiene technician staff to coordinate basic standards and to transfer technological information, especially information about production systems from manufacturers, from the retailer to small producers.
Managing production in the innovation network
Relations within and between firms in the innovation network are ''fluid and dynamic''. Retailer A's chilled ready-meal NPD unit is part of the fresh foods division and incorporates buyers responsible for recipe development. The chilled ready-meals unit is headed by the Senior Trading Manager for Fresh Foods 14 and has a permanent team of 26 people that includes a product development team, working on recipe development with suppliers, and 6 buyers who are responsible for the day-to-day administrative, commercial side of the business. The unit works with the fresh foods division staff that liaise with the food technicians in the hygiene department (who have a total staff of 198), logistics, marketing, procurement, legal/technical department and packaging technologists. This organization is mirrored in suppliers. The chilled ready-meals NPD unit and their supplier counterparts spend around 50 per cent of their time in each other's firms or in central meeting grounds. ''Some of the factories now are like large hotel kitchens, because it has become more and more specialised and the runs have become smaller'' and in these cases the ongoing exchange of staff and knowledge for development and monitoring is especially important. This is of special importance in this segment, as the technical requirements of the packaging are so demanding. The NPD unit therefore coordinates internal departments, external manufacturers and third-party packaging firms. 15 In the case of a micro-kitchen, Retailer A supplies access to its packaging and food hygiene and production experts through the chilled ready-meals unit and ''really do work very closely together''. 13 The difference in relationships between the largest and smallest suppliers is something that the literature has not focused on, and which this study did not directly address. However, this, and the issue of firm growth through relational contracting in dependent network relations, is an area worthy of future attention. This study found little differences in the transaction cost issues for smaller suppliers. 14 The senior trading manager was our main interview respondent for the innovation network within Retailer A. 15 In the case of larger manufacturers packaging is managed specifically for each customer, and often through thirdparty specialist firms as well. Where large manufacturers do produce packaging this is in close development with the retailer's hygiene, marketing, procurement and packaging departments through the chilled ready-meal NPD unit.
THE CONTROL NETWORK
Retailers' control networks differ from the open-ended relational networks that they have established for innovation, and are characterized more by formal contractual arrangements. The radical changes that have occurred in the UK grocery supply chain have been well documented, especially from the fields of logistics and supply-chain management (Fernie and Pierrel 1996; Burt and Sparks 1997) . By focusing on the economic relationships and drawing on our detailed interview-based research with Retailer A's internal logistics department and external contractors, we offer new insights to the processes at work. Retailers' control of the supply chain represents a sophisticated form of network organization that is essentially one of subcontracted coordination. Although at first glance this system appears similar to conventional subcontracting, a closer examination of the linkages reveals a system that more closely resembles a form of upstream franchising, with novel solutions to organization problems. Under traditional subcontracting arrangements, the retailer devolves process and operations to a logistics subcontractor. The true costs and risks are obscured by the problems of information impactedness and asset specificity, as when the contractor buys or builds dedicated facilities such as warehouses. Much of the economics-based literature on the management of the supply chain focuses on these issues and the mix between internalization and externalization (Buck 1990; Ross 1997; Bourlakis 1998 ). However, this approach underplays the changing nature of the modes of externalization employed, and the ways in which transaction cost problems centring on uncertainty and opportunism have been addressed in novel and sophisticated ways. In the control network, the retailer seeks to resolve these problems by retaining ownership of the key assets and by controlling the coordination of information and supplier processes directly throughout the network via their command of the computer information system. In the following sections we will first examine the development of the supply chain in the UK food retail industry, and following this we concentrate on examining Retailer A's control network.
From a warehouse-based to a replenishment-based supply chain
Grocery retailers in the UK have achieved control over IT-based systems of supplychain coordination. This has changed the nature of the supply chain from a warehousebased system to one where retailers manage their inventory on a replenishment-based just-in-time system with little stock holding. This not only enables retailers to economize on warehousing costs, but also allows them to correlate demand and supply with unprecedented accuracy. Managing the logistics of product distribution emerged in the early 1980s as a major objective of the food retailers in the UK (Quarmby 1988) , in particular, the goal of centralizing their logistics and distribution operations to use ''logistical competency to gain competitive advantage'' (Bowersox 1998) . The retailer J. Sainsbury pioneered the development of dedicated regional distribution centres (RDCs) in the 1970s as an intermediate stage in the distribution process. These RDCs operated on Sainsbury's behalf but were owned by one of the growing number of specialist distributors through a process of subcontracting whereby contractors were guaranteed fixed-term management fees. Transportation of products from the RDCs to the stores was then largely undertaken directly by Sainsbury's own fleet of vehicles (McKinnon 1989) . By the 1990s, the RDC pattern had become established with British food retailers, although they increasingly owned the RDCs, which they had either built themselves, or bought from contractors at the end of contract periods. In addition, retailers began to encourage the development of primary consolidation centres (PCCs) to which manufacturers were able to deliver increasingly small batch-driven loads, prior to their transfer to the RDCs. These allowed very small crate (rather than pallet) based deliveries to be made. Crates can accommodate partial boxes, ideal for the delivery of very short shelf-life low-volume, high value-added products such as ready-meals. The efficiency therefore does not come from standardized delivery and economies of scale. Indeed, as the logistics manager of Retailer A notes, the drawback of the system is that ''you are moving more air'' but the compensating advantage is derived from the degree to which it is possible to accurately match supply and demand. Larger manufacturers can coordinate the collection of stock from small suppliers for delivery into the PCC. Therefore, as long as the retailers use their transparent EDI system to coordinate and control this process they can manage the supply chain from beginning to end. Under this system of organization, the RDCs no longer carry out a warehousing function, but consolidate goods for demand-driven direct delivery to retail outlets. The distribution and logistic structure, using both RDCs and PCCs, allows small manufacturers to join the supply chain efficiently, and for large manufacturers to supply products on demand, rather than by bulk delivery.
The mechanism by which coordination has been achieved is via ICT-based communication and information exchange systems. The gradual adoption of electronic point of sale (EPOS) replenishment systems in the early 1980s, and scanning technology in the mid-1980s allowed the supply chain to be managed in a more efficient way.
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Grocery retailers, constrained by the perishable nature of certain products, were at the forefront of the move from inventory-based systems to customer-driven systems (MacDonald 1994) . The ability to use EDI between organizations in real time is a key feature of being able to manage inter-firm systems of coordination (Hughes and Merton 1996; Mason-Jones and Towill 1998) . This ability to manage the supply chain allowed retailers to switch to customer demand-driven 17 systems of replenishment (Ody and Newman 1991; Smart 1995; Fernie and Pierrel 1996; Winters 1996) , and encouraged the expansion of their control backwards down the supply chain. These factors led to a boom in the 1980s of third-party contractors to handle distribution (Fernie 1997) , and the domination of the supply chain by retailers at the expense of 16 The development of these generic IT systems was coordinated in the UK by the Institute of Grocery Distributors (IGD), a trade body founded in 1975 comprised of retailers, manufacturers and distributors (Bamfield 1994; de Angeli 1995) . Indeed, the logistics literature has detailed how retailers have turned around the management of the supply chain. The IGD, for example, set-up the Article Numbering Association (ANA) in 1976, which set common standards for bar-coding, leading eventually to the adoption of an e-standard in 1997. 17 Information as to customer buying patterns and trends has been gathered from store data and loyalty card information. Data warehousing was becoming common in the late 1990s, as retailers continued to gather information on the buying patterns of consumers. Data mining technologies allowed them to develop bundles of products and promotions to exploit consumer demand. The retailers have used this knowledge for product development. They have been in the sole position to gather this information, and it must be noted that in a system of transparent information, this critical information is guarded closely within the organization.
manufacturing firms, who saw their distribution services decimated (Whiteoak 1993; Cooper et al. 1994) . By moving their direct management backwards into the chain of logistics (Fernie and Sparks 1998) , retailers were able to gather information regarding the role of wholesaling much more effectively and to introduce their own computercontrolled stock management systems into this aspect of the value chain. As a result, retailers have been able to unbundle many of the costs of services that were supplied by wholesaling subcontractors and gain much more precise information over a variety of costs that had previously been beyond their purview. This unbundling process is especially significant. Traditional subcontracting relationships are complicated by the provision of a bundle of value-added services, asset specificity, and the problem of contractor-based risk. In such cases, bilateral negotiation is undertaken. In contrast, the removal of these questions simplifies the process of negotiation, lowering the costs of individual transactions. The management of RDCs has in many cases been subcontracted to third parties in a system that effectively involves reverse-franchising. The retailer retains direct ownership of the asset (such as a warehouse or fleet) and the computer-controlled stock management system, but subcontracts out the operation and various other support services that the physical management of the asset requires. Thus the integrated information system underpins and provides control over an organizational structure that actually constitutes a network of independent firms revolving around the hub played by the retailer's head office. This arrangement represents the inverse of the concept of ''hollowing-out'', since it allows the company to maintain control over the critical system-wide information whilst enabling it to relinquish direct responsibility for its management. And whilst this arrangement requires the management of many times the number of discrete transactions than would be involved in conventional subcontracting, the costs of managing these transactions has been sharply reduced by the development of computerized information management systems.
In relation to distribution, subcontractors and the management of RDCs, the traditional problems of opportunism and bounded rationality are circumvented by three means. First, subcontractors' management fees do not include risks associated with building idiosyncratic assets (such as RDCs), because the retailers have either internalized these costs, or given guarantees to agents by means of extended and relational contracts. Second, manufacturers are not able to conflate distribution costs into the cost of manufacture because they no longer undertake these functions. Third, because of retailers' involvement in controlling the flow of supply-chain information through the system, they are very aware of the real costs involved. This also applies, as was observed in the innovation network, to the costs of development and the manufacture when retailers are directly involved in the process. The outcome of these changes in logistics and RDC management subcontracting is a move towards open book negotiation with retailers, a system based on low management fees in conjunction with reward structures for efficiency improvements.
Retailer A: unbundling costs and managing multiple relationships
A close examination of Retailer A's supply chain illustrates the operation of the linkages within the control network. Retailer A's logistics department is formed by a director operating with a team of four senior managers, of which one is the manager for ambient and frozen goods and one for chilled and perishable goods. The managers are responsible for the day-to-day running of the supply chain and work with a total staff of 250 employees. Retailer A's distribution network comprises of 24 RDCs and 13 PCCs as shown in Table 5 . The supply chain is coordinated by Retailer A's hardware and software systems. Retailer A's logistics manager commented that ''If you go to (Contractor O's) RDC it's our hardware even if they own the depot'' explaining that this integration makes the supply chain transparent to the retailer.
Unless you knew that RDC 2 was owned by us and RDC 12 was owned by (Contractor N), you can't see the difference . . . you have the same information and the computer systems dictate the processes and methods of working. Throughout the supply-chain really you have our systems.
The same condition applies in the case of physical distribution, where the contractors that operate Retailer A's fleet own only 50 per cent of the RDC-to-store vehicles. Logistics contractors explained that the transparency afforded to retailers both by the integration of their computer systems and the benchmarking provided by their own operations supplied them with a high level of information about costs: Contractor M relating that Retailer A's ''knowledge about costs is as great as ours is. There is nothing hidden there for us to extract margins from.'' Consequently Contractor M's management fee declined from 15 per cent to 10 per cent to 5 per cent to 2 per cent on each contract renewal. Coupled with increased information transparency, Retailer A's decision to build its own (or buy back) RDCs led to a change in emphasis in contractor's reward structures, moving from management fees based on fixed-volume freight rates to a system based on low management fees with an incentive structure for productivity gains. ''Quite often it is the retailer's capital and the fee therefore becomes two tier-a fixed fee and then a sum of money that is deliverable in addition if service or costs are improved.'' This profoundly alters the nature of relationship between retailer and contractor, and this can be observed in longer contract lengthsRetailers A's contracts with Contractor M having increased from 2 to 5 years. Within this longer-term relationship Retailer A and its suppliers pool information on real incurred costs during negotiation in order to arrive at the mutually acceptable distribution of costs and profits, with the retailer sometimes finding that contractors' actual costs were higher than its own predictions and adjusting rewards to account for this. As a result of this framework, the close relations enable Retailer A to use fewer contractors in more trusted mutually advantageous relationships-indicated by the fact that only two contractors are responsible for managing six out of their eight externally managed RDCs. Casson (1997: 122) has used the term ''communal networks'' to describe forms of coordination in which existing high levels of trust act to facilitate price negotiation through the removal of opportunistic threats and uncertainties that usually result from one party bearing irreversible costs. Cooperative price negotiation therefore helps to foster longer-term relationships in contrast to competitive tendering, a situation demonstrated by retailers adopting longer-term contracts, facilitating trust. In this case, however, the mutual trust that develops within such a ''communal network'' is an outcome of the information transparency engendered by the retailer's computer systems rather than being a precursor.
In their management of the RDC-to-store supply chain, Retailer A negotiates contracts with third-party logistics firms to manage specific RDC management contracts.
18 The PCC network is significantly different from the RDC network, and less under the direct control of the retailer. The PCC exists to allow larger manufacturers to make smaller, more regular demand-driven deliveries to RDCs, and to bring smaller suppliers within the supermarket's supply chain, allowing infrequent deliveries of products or regular deliveries of small loads. This capability is critical for chilled foods because the production volumes on some lines are already relatively small, in the case of Retailer A 90 per cent of products selling less than six units a week per store. Large and medium food manufacturers with their own distribution systems (such as Northern Foods and Geest) and small regional logistics companies are in the ideal position to collect small crate loads from suppliers and make consolidated deliveries into PCCs. This is only efficient if these small loads are consolidated for multiple retailers, so the job of Retailer A's logistics manager is to go round and convince the suppliers that it is in their interest to become part of this network, because [Contractor O] is not just going to a supplier and picking up for us but for Retailer C and Retailer D as well.
The composition of the PCC network means that it is regionally constrained and local in nature. In operational terms this means that Manufacturer X's Midlands PCC is run by Contractor O, which collects goods from local suppliers (within a limited 1-1 1 2 hour road time from the PCC). Manufacturer X then delivers to Retailer A's eight regional RDCs. For Retailer A this means that managing and extending the PCC network entails recreating and managing many relationships with local firms. As in the innovation network, Retailer A manages multiple relationships with suppliers and adds value by central coordination.
Information exchange and innovation
The supply chain described in the previous section can be represented by the flow of physical goods shown in Figure 2 . Through POS information, retailers respond to demand by ordering from their suppliers the stock needed to fulfil or, increasingly, anticipate demand. Orders are passed directly to suppliers' computer systems through the EDI network, where they are tracked by the retailer's control of the IT information system through primary and secondary consolidation points before delivery to individual outlets. This control over the supply chain is fundamental to the existence of the chilled ready-meal market. It allows retailers to correlate supply with demand (vital for extremely short-life products where wastage tends to vary between 20 and 40 per cent of output) through the delivery of small batches and allows small specialist suppliers to be incorporated into the supply chain. The transparent information system coordinating the supply chain has changed the nature of relationships, and the potential structure of linkages, between manufacturers and retailers. Integration of the information network allows retailers to work more closely with suppliers and contractors than typical contractual models suggest. The POS data is the critical information that drives the supply chain, and is tightly controlled by the retailer. This is because the POS information can be exploited not only to match supply and demand, but in the case of chilled ready-meals, to develop and innovate new products for markets revealed by this data. The potential for close relationships in the supply chain allows retailers to form supply-chain-based networks with firms that own complementary assets and the capabilities to exploit these revealed consumer demands.
CONCLUSION
This paper has used insights drawn from Casson's reformulation of the economic theory of the firm based on information requirements to explore the changing structure of inter-firm relations in the UK's food processing and retailing industry. In Casson's view, the structure of institutions at any given time can be interpreted as a rational response to the social need to economize on information costs (Casson 1997: 3) . The importance of such an approach is that it provides a starting point for embedding a variety of organizational forms of economic coordination-firms, markets, networks-into an integrated theoretical framework. In this framework, relationships between firms that are not mediated purely by the price mechanism (i.e. interorganizational networks) can be treated as a response to the changing imperatives of information management within an economic system. The present paper, however, attempts to move beyond the idea of treating networks purely as an efficiency response and considers how the possession of certain critical information may confer enduring forms of competitive advantage on specific actors within a given industry, particularly within the vertical value-adding chain.
In the food processing and retailing industry, the emergence of sophisticated computerized information management systems has placed the leading retailers in a potentially dominant position. In the case of the vertical supply chain, ownership of inventory management software extends the reach of supermarket chains through the distribution process and has enabled them to exert a significant degree of control over the strategies of food producers and manufacturers as well. We have termed this a network of control. In addition, data generated and recorded at the point of sale on customer preferences and purchasing patterns has given British supermarkets access to information that can be utilized, in conjunction with food processors and packaging firms, to directly initiate aspects of NPD. These firm alliances we have termed a network of innovation.
The implications of these information-centred networks of control and innovation for the structure of the food processing and retailing industry are particularly well exemplified by the development of the chilled ready-meals sector. These meals represent a type of product in which accurate management of the supply chain and stock replenishment process is a critical determinant of success, and where the high profit margins that are achievable stand to be undermined by high wastage rates. Only with the ability to effectively manage both the production and distribution of these items are the supermarkets able to exploit this potentially lucrative market segment. Moreover, the financial benefits to be gained from the successful management of these products are further enhanced by the reputation advantages that the supermarkets receive through the continued development of these relatively expensive, high-quality items that carry the brand name of the retailer. Indeed, the perception of British supermarkets as innovative businesses has been built to an important degree on the ever-extending range and quality of these chilled readymeals, despite the well-known fact that the products are manufactured by independent (but anonymous) suppliers. Thus the reputation of the retailer actually depends upon its quality control system, which represents the fulcrum of the networks of control and innovation. Retailer A's NPD manager made this point clearly by stating that:
when you look at our competitors . . . the only thing that's different is the own-brand offering because Heinz baked beans are Heinz baked beans . . . so the big point of difference we offer our customers in own-brand is really through quality. Chicken Tikka Masala is the perfect example-everybody's got it but who has the best one?
Thus, both the NPD and supply-chain management systems represent inter-firm networks that are ultimately driven by consumer demands. Access to data on purchasing patterns stands at the centre of each network and is, in each case, under the control of supermarkets. However, the structure of the two networks differs. In terms of NPD, the alliances formed between supermarkets, packaging companies and manufacturers are based on an open exchange of information as the effective competitive pressures are horizontal in nature, i.e. between competing alliances of such collaborative networks. No formal ownership links need to be developed between these firms who are bound together via gentlemen's agreements of mutual benefit. Information may be freely shared, although the retailer's access to the end customer remains of crucial importance.
The institutional structure of the control networks is more complex. Effective management of the supply chain by supermarkets requires the extension of its computer-based information management system along the length of the vertical chain. Thus, some degree of vertical integration has historically been a pre-requisite for the development of this network of control. In this case it has involved direct management by retailers of the final tier of distribution through the provision of RDCs and vehicle fleets. Over time, however, supermarkets have subcontracted the management of these services to independent contractors, and have ultimately transferred ownership of some of these facilities whilst retaining control over the management of the information system embedded within them. Indeed, the more recent development of PCCs has been an initiative in which retailers have promoted a new layer of distribution that incorporates supermarkets' supply-chain information systems but in which they hold no ownership or management responsibilities whatsoever. The transparency afforded to the supermarkets through the operation of these management information systems has had the effect of removing information asymmetries between actors along the supply chain and allowed for much higher levels of trust in inter-firm negotiations.
There is no doubt that the changes outlined in this paper have served to enhance the competitive position of retailers in the UK relative to other actors in the industry. The decision by the Director General of Fair Trading to refer the operations of the leading supermarket chains for investigation by the Competition Commission in April 1999 was provoked by a general sense of unease about their competitive strength relative to both suppliers and consumers (Dobson et al. 1998) . In fact, the findings of the Commission suggested that neither the prices charged nor the profits made by the supermarkets were excessive (Competition Commission 2002: 6) . Within the supply chain, the buying power and control exerted by the supermarkets created, according to the Commission's summary, ''a climate of apprehension among many suppliers in their relationship with the main parties'' and also appeared to discourage suppliers from investing in NPD and innovation (Competition Commission 2002: 5) . In a more detailed assessment, however, the relationship between the supermarkets and their suppliers was shown to be more complex. In the case of own-brand suppliers, there was evidence of supermarkets encouraging and collaborating in product innovation and of good, long-term supplier relations. On the other hand, producers of undifferentiated goods and branded manufacturers exhibited less harmonious relations with the large multiple retailers (Competition Commission 2002: 240-241) .
A critical finding of the Commission's report was the growing importance in the food processing and retailing industry of efficient consumer response (ECR). This involves both supply management, through continuous replenishment and automated store ordering, and demand management in which retailers and suppliers jointly manage product categories. Both of these activities are based on the use of information systems of the kind discussed in this paper (Competition Commission 2002: 241-243) . In similar fashion, a recent analysis of the sector has noted that added value will continue to be the major driver in the food market, citing a spokesman from the large retailers as follows: ''consumers change enormously and out of that comes opportunity. What we have to do is become the one that realises that opportunity . . . '' (Key Note Report 2002: 49) .
The observations made in this paper have implications both for theory and the study of network organizations. In particular, they highlight the limitations of transaction cost theory's focus on firm boundaries and emphasize the need to place information flows at the heart of institutional analysis. Clearly, the increasing incidence of inter-firm collaboration points to a general need to analyse networks as systems rather than focusing on specific manifestations such as subcontracting, alliances and joint ventures. Our paper shows that the networks underpinning the chilled readymeals sector are dynamic structures, which evolve in relation to technical change and involve elements of both control and innovation. It is our contention that the example of the ready-meals sector is an indication of the potential role of IT more generally and a signal of the growing importance of consumer information to the competitive process. Such long-term relationships between those firms whose activities are close to customers and their suppliers using ICT-driven networks are poised to become still more prevalent in industries where competition is fundamentally demand-driven.
